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ABSTRACT
JUDGING CONTINGENCIES ACCURATELY:
THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK, PRACTICE, AND SELF-EFFICACY
by
Steven C. Clark 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1997
Some psychologists have claimed that people are not good 
at judging covariation (e.g., Smedslund, 1963; Jenkins &
Ward, 1965) . This claim, however, has been based on the 
results of experiments that may not have been optimal for 
promoting judgmental accuracy (Allan & Jenkins, 1980) . Other 
psychologists have claimed that people are relatively good 
judges of covariation (e.g., wasserman, Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 
1983; Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984). Common to most of this 
research is an experimental paradigm in which participants do 
not ever receive feedback concerning the accuracy of their 
judgments.
The two experiments in this dissertation were designed 
to promote accuracy in the judgment of contingency by 
providing (a) accurate feedback concerning participants' 
judgments and (b) practice with judging many contingency 
problems. The results of these experiments indicate that 
people become better judges of contingency with feedback and
xii
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practice, but do not improve with practice alone. This is 
true for positive contingencies (Experiment l) and negative 
contingencies (Experiment 2) . Judgmental accuracy was 
greatest for extreme contingency problems (AP less them -.75
and greater than .75) .
Self-efficacy has been shown to account for performance 
in a variety of domains above and beyond ability. Experiment 
1 addressed the relation between self-efficacy, feedback, and 
judgmental accuracy. Mean self-efficacy increased over the 
course of the experiment for participants in the feedback 
condition, but decreased for participants in the no feedback 
condition. Participants with high self-efficacy in the 
feedback condition showed relatively accurate judgments of 
contingency, but participants with high self-efficacy in the 
no feedback condition showed relatively inaccurate judgments 
of contingency.
Experiment l also addressed whether judgmental accuracy 
on one contingency task transferred to judgmental accuracy on 
a different task. The results indicate that there was no 
transfer in accuracy from one task to another.
xiii
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1INTRODUCTION
An important prerequisite of adaptive behavior is 
sensitivity to covariation. Without some sense of what events 
are related, adaptive behavior can occur only by accident.
And having occurred by accident, adaptive behavior will 
continue as a matter of chance if one is not sensitive to the 
relation between responses and outcomes (Hermstein, 1966) . 
Perhaps for this reason, considerable research has focused on 
people's ability to judge the covariation between events.
(See Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Crocker, 1981; Shaklee, 1983; 
and wasserman, 1990) Studied in different ways and for 
different purposes, this research has been known variously as 
the judgment of covariation, correlation, contingency, 
control, and causation. (Covariation is the most general of 
the terms and does not denote a causal relation between the 
variables. Contingency, the term I use to refer to the 
present research, does denote a causal relation between the 
variables.) The judgment of covariation has been of interest 
to psychologists because it addresses people's sensitivity to 
the relation between events.
Smedslund (1963) asked nursing students to judge the 
correlation between variables on a number of different tasks. 
In one task, the students sorted through a deck of 100 cards 
which each contained eight letters: four of them representing 
a symptom (chosen from among the letters A, B, C, D, or E)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2and four of them representing a diagnosis (chosen from among 
the letters F, G, H, I, or J). Participants judged the 
relation between symptom A and diagnosis F based on what they 
observed in the deck of cards. Smedslund's results indicated 
that his participants were not good judges of the empirical 
correlation, leading him to conclude that
normal adults with no training in statistics do not 
have a cognitive structure isomorphic with the 
concept of correlation. Their strategies and 
inferences reveal a particularistic, non- 
statistical approach, or an exclusive dependence on 
the frequency of [positive confirming] instances.
(p. 172)
Other psychologists have found that people can make 
relatively accurate covariation judgments. Wasserman and 
Shaklee (1984) presented college students with a scenario in 
which a person (Kim) was trying to fix a malfunctioning 
radio. Kim's tapping on one of the radio's internal wires and 
the radio's intermittent buzzing were presented on time lines 
which recorded when each occurred. Wasserman and Shaklee 
found that participants accurately judged the contingency 
problems.
While Smedslund (1963) and wasserman and Shaklee (1984) 
came to different conclusions about people's ability to judge 
covariation, their experiments were procedurally similar in 
one important way--participants were never informed of their 
degree of judgmental accuracy. This lack of feedback is 
common to most judgment of covariation research (Hogarth,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31981). Unfortunately, this creates an experimental setting 
quite different from the real-world in which we typically 
receive feedback (McFarland, 1971) . Further, many experiments 
require participants to make only a few judgments. In the 
real-world, we make many judgments as part of an ongoing 
process. Most judgment of covariation experiments, however, 
lack these elements.
My primary purpose in the present research was to 
evaluate judgmental accuracy with and without feedback. 
Participants judged a number of problems during the 
experimental session to assess whether practice would improve 
judgmental accuracy. I also investigated the role of self- 
efficacy in the judgment of contingency and whether there is 
a transfer of judgmental accuracy from one judgment task to 
another.
A Note, on Variables and Measures of Covariation
Some covariation research has utilized more than two 
variables or variables that can have more than two states.
The majority of the research in this area, however, has been 
done with two binary variables (Allan, 1993) . When research 
is done with two binary variables, all possible combinations 
of the two variables can be recorded in a 2 X 2 table (see 
Figure 1) . On the top of the table are the two states of one 
variable, such as the illumination of a light occurring (0) 
or not occurring (no 0) . On the side of the table are the two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4states of the other variable, such as pressing a telegraph 
key (R) or not {no R) .
Figure 1




Instances of Cell A have been called "positive 
confirming" cases because both variables are present or co­
occur (R, 0) . instances of Cells B and C have been called 
"disconfiming cases" because one variable is present but the 
other is not (R, no 0 and no R, 0). Instances of Cell D have 
been called "negative confirming" cases because neither 
variable is present (no R, no 0).
The example just given cam be classified as a one- 
response one-outcome contingency task (Allan, 1993). In a 
one-response one-outcome contingency task (1R/10), 
participants cam make a single active response on each trial 
(e.g., press a button or do not press it), and then a single 
active outcome may result (e.g., a light is illuminated or it 
is not illuminated) . In a two-response two-outcome 
contingency task (2R/20) , participamts can choose which of
Outcome 
O NoO
Cell A Cell B
Cell C CellD
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5two active responses to make on each trial (e.g., press 
button A or press button B), and one of two active outcomes 
occurs (e.g., light Y is illuminated or light Z is 
illuminated) . The difference between a 1R/10 task and a 2R/20 
task may seem trivial, but Allan & Jenkins (1980) found that 
participants made more accurate judgments on a 1R/10 task 
than a 2R/20 task. In addition, the above nomenclature of 
confirming and disconfirming cases loses its relevance in a 
2R/20 task. Instead, there are simply four types of events. 
The experiments conducted for this dissertation employ 1R/10 
tasks.
The actual relation between two binary variables can be 
statistically defined in a number of ways (Allan, 1980) . The 
most common measure in the judgment of contingency literature 
isAP, the probability of an outcome given a response minus 
the probability of an outcome given no response (AP = p [0/R] - 
p [O/no R] or in terms of the four cells of the 2 X 2  table, AP 
= A/ [A+B] -C/[C+D]) . AP reflects a one-way contingency or
relation, such as the relation between one's pressing a key 
and the illumination of a light. AP values can range from 
-1.00 to 1.00. AP = 1.00 indicates a perfect positive
contingency (e.g., a press always causes a flash, a flash 
never occurs without a press). AP = -1.00 indicates a perfect
negative contingency (e.g., a press always prevents a flash, 
a flash always occurs without a press). AP = .00 indicates
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6noncontingency (e.g., pressing has no effect on the 
flashing).
There are other measures of covariation which reflect a 
joint relation between the variables. When both variables 
influence the outcome of the other, x2 and <{> are often used 
to statistically define the relation (x2 = N[AD-BC]2 /
((A+B) (C+D) (A+C) (B+D) ] and (j) = square root of x2/N) . These 
measures are less common than AP in the judgment of
contingency literature (Allan, 1980).
Research Indicating Judgmental Inaccuracy 
Smedslund (1963)
One of the early investigations of the judgment of 
correlation was conducted by Smedslund (1963) . He presented 
several paper-and-pencil judgment of contingency tasks to 
student nurses. The first was the card sorting task that was 
described above. This was a serial presentation of the data, 
meaning that the data were presented sequentially. In a 
second task, participants judged the relation between symptom 
A and diagnosis F based on summary information which reported 
the cell frequencies for a 2 X 2 table. In a third task, 
students sorted through a deck of 100 cards which contained 
information only about the presence or absence of symptom A 
(+A or -A) and diagnosis F (+F or -F) . Regardless of the task 
they were given, students' judgments were unrelated to the 
actual contingency. Smedslund reported that to the extent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7that his participants reasoned statistically, they relied 
almost exclusively on Cell A cases.
Jenkins and Ward (1965)
Jenkins and Ward (1965) also reported that people are 
not good judges of contingency. Participants in Jenkins and 
ward's experiments participated in a two-response two-outcome 
contingency task (2R/20). Participants could press either of 
two buttons and then observe the illumination of one of two 
lights. The contingency problems consisted of 60 self-paced 
discrete trials. In a discrete-trial task there are clearly 
defined trials which each have a period for a response and an 
outcome. In Jenkins & ward's experiments, participants 
pressed one of the two buttons and then pressed a "test" 
button which illuminated one of the two outcome lights. After 
one of the lights had been illuminated for two seconds, the 
experimental apparatus was automatically reset for the next 
trial. Participants completed five contingency problems.
In their first experiment, Jenkins and Ward told some 
participants that their task was to "score" as many points as 
possible by causing a designated light to illuminate as a 
result of their button pressing. Jenkins and Ward told other 
participants that their task was to "control" the 
illumination of the two lights through their button pressing. 
Yoked to these active participants, observer participants 
watched the responses and outcomes on a display panel in 
another room. Regardless of participants' experimental
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8condition ("score" or "control" instructions, active or 
observer role), Jenkins and Ward found that there was little 
relation between participants' judgments and the actual 
contingency of the problems they completed.
In Jenkins and ward's (1965) second experiment, 
participants judged the same contingency problems as in 
Experiment l and answered additional questions concerning 
their ability to control the illumination of the lights. They 
also answered questions which addressed their understanding 
of the concepts of probability. Again, participants' 
judgments were unrelated to the actual contingency of the 
problems.
In Jenkins and Ward's third experiment, participants 
completed two training problems before completing the same 
problems that were used in the previous experiments. One of 
the training problems had AP = .00 and the other had AP = .80.
Even after these training problems, participants' judgments 
bore little relation to the actual contingencies of the test 
problems.
Research indicating.. Judgmental Accuracy
Smedslund (1963) and Jenkins and Ward (1965) concluded 
that people are poor judges of covariation. They based their 
conclusion on what most psychologists would regard as poor 
performance on the part of their participants. In situations 
like these, it is easy to say how people fared. But at what 
point does one conclude that people are good judges of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9covariation? In other words, what are the criteria of 
judgmental accuracy? Even in the articles that suggest that 
people are good judges of contingency, there are no universal 
criteria for judgmental accuracy. But there are indications 
that participants can make relatively accurate judgments, 
wasserman. Chatlosh. and NPiinahor MQftD
Wasserman, Chatlosh, and Neunaber (1983) found that 
participants made accurate contingency judgments on a free- 
operant 1R/10 task. A free-operant task is procedurally 
different from a discrete-trial task in that there is not any 
sort of inter-trial interval or marker. Instead, participants 
can respond at any time during the problem. Outcomes are 
presented at the end of experimentally defined sampling 
intervals, such as one second.
In their experiments, Wasserman et al. (1983) had 
participants judge the effect of their key pressing on the 
illumination of a light, recording their judgments on a 201 
point scale (-100 = prevents the light from occurring; 100 = 
causes the light to occur) . Participants could respond or not 
respond at any time during the experiment and were instructed 
to observe what happened when they did and did not respond. 
Each participant completed nine contingency problems in a 
randomly determined order. The probability of an outcome 
given a response (p [0/R]) and the probability of an outcome 
given no response (p[0/no R]) were one of three levels, .125, 
.500, and .875. In combination, these probabilities produced
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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nine problems with five levels of contingency: AP = -.750, 
-.375, .000, .375, and .750.
Wasserman et al. (1983, Experiment l) instructed 
participants in one condition to respond by tapping the 
telegraph key but not hold it down (tap condition) and in 
another condition to respond by pressing the key down and 
holding it (press condition). Each problem consisted of 240 
one-second sampling intervals. Wasserman et al. found 
relatively accurate judgments in both experimental 
conditions. For exaxiple, participants in the tap condition 
gave the following ratings for the five levels of 
contingency: AP = -.750, M = -68; AP = -.375, M = -30; AP = 
.000, M = 0; AP = .375, M = 30; AP = .750, M = 75.
In their second experiment, Wasserman et al. (1983) 
manipulated both the length of the sampling interval and the 
number of sampling intervals. In one condition, participants 
had 240 one-second sampling intervals per problem. In a 
second condition, participants had 60 one-second sampling 
intervals. And in a third condition, participants had 60 
four-second sampling intervals. Participants in all three 
conditions made accurate judgments of contingency.
In their third experiment, Wasserman et al. (1983) 
manipulated the nature of the sampling interval. In one 
condition, the sampling interval was a fixed three seconds, 
in the other condition, the sampling interval was three 
seconds on average, but any given interval could be one,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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three, or five seconds long. Again, participants provided 
judgments that were sensitive to the actual level of 
contingency in the problems.
Wasserman and Shaklee (1984)
Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) explored the effects of 
presenting contingency information in several different 
paper-and-pencil formats. Some prior research indicated that 
judgments of contingency are more accurate when the data are 
presented in a summary table than when they are presented 
serially (e.g., sorting through a stack of cards). Wasserman 
and Shaklee proposed that this difference in accuracy may be 
due to the added memory demands of the serial presentation. 
When participants see data presented serially, they must not 
only make a judgment, but they must also try to count and 
then recall the frequencies of the events. Wasserman and 
Shaklee designed their experiments to compare summary table 
presentation and serial presentation in a setting in which 
the two tasks had similar memory demands. They used time 
lines which recorded on a single page all of the data for an 
entire problem.
Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) conducted four experiments 
in which participants judged 24 contingency problems, 
recording their judgments on a nine point scale (-4 = 
prevents-the .sound from occurring; o = has no effect: 4 = 
causes the sound to occur) . The probability of an outcome 
given a response (p [0/R]) and the probability of an outcome
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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given no response (p[O/no R]) were one of five levels: .00, 
.25, .50, .75, and 1.00. In combination, these probabilities 
produced 24 problems with nine levels of contingency: AP =
-1.00, -.75, -.50, -.25, .00, .25, .50, .75, and 1.00.
Participants’ judgments of these contingencies were 
sensitive to the varying levels of AP . For example, in
Wasserman and Shaklee’s (1984) Experiment 2, participants 
made half of their judgments based on summary tables and half 
of their judgments based on time lines. Wasserman and Shaklee 
found that judgments were similar for the two formats. In 
both formats, the mean judgments of the participants scaled 
the contingency problems. That is, if the task had been to 
rank order the contingency problems, the participants' mean 
judgments would have put them in the correct order, from 
smallest to largest. For example, judgments for the summary 
table information were as follows: AP = -1.00, M = -1.44; AP = 
-.75, M = -1.36; AP = -.50, M = -.71; AP = -.25, M = -.53; AP = 
.00, M = .22; AP = .25, M = .51; AP = .50, M = 1.17; AP = .75,
IS = 1.25; AP = 1.00, £S = 2.44. Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) 
found a similar pattern of results in all four of their 
experiments.
Attempts to Improve Accuracy Through Training
In contrast to Smedslund (1963) and Jenkins and Ward 
(1965), Wasserman et al. (1983) and Wasserman and Shaklee 
(1984) found that people make accurate judgments of 
contingency. Other experiments have found similar results
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980, 1983; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; 
Peterson, 1980; and Ward & Jenkins, 1965). There is little 
evidence, however, indicating whether people's judgments 
become more accurate with experience and training. This is 
the principle focus of the present research. To date, only 
two experiments have systematically tried to improve 
judgmental accuracy through training.
Jenkins and Ward (1965)
One attempt to improve the accuracy of participants' 
judgments was undertaken by Jenkins and Ward (1965) . As was 
mentioned above, Jenkins and Ward found in their Experiments 
l and 2 that participants' judgments of contingency were not 
related to the actual contingency of the problems, in an 
attempt to improve participants' accuracy in their third 
experiment, Jenkins and Ward's (1965) participants corrpleted 
two training problems prior to performing the same judgment 
of contingency problems as in Experiments l and 2. One of the 
training problems had AP = .80. Prior to starting this
problem, Jenkins and Ward told participants, "You will have 
very good control over the outcomes by your choice of 
responses" (p. 13). Participants were shown a sample answer 
sheet that had been marked at 80 (0 = No Control: 100 = 
Complete Control) and then they completed the problem. The 
other training problem hadAP = .00. Prior to starting this 
problem, Jenkins and Ward told participants, "Your choice of 
responses will have no influence over which outcome will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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appear" (p. 13) . Participants were shown a sample answer 
sheet that had been marked at 0 (0 = No Control; 100 = 
Complete Control) and then they conpleted the problem.
As in their Experiments l and 2, Jenkins and Ward (1965) 
found that there was little relation between participant's 
judgments and the actual contingency of the problem.
One of the reasons why their training may not have been 
effective is that Jenkins and Ward’s experimental task was 
not conducive to accurate judgments. Jenkins and Ward used a 
2R/20 task. Allan and Jenkins (1980) showed in a series of 
experiments that participants who have a single response 
option (lR--move a joystick or not move a joystick) provide 
more accurate judgments than participants who have two 
response options (2R--move the joystick to the right or move 
the joystick to the left).
Another explanation for why Jenkins and ward’s (1965) 
training did not improve judgmental accuracy is that their 
training was limited to two problems. This is a limited 
amount of exposure to a relatively complex task.
Clark and Benassi (in press)
Clark and Benassi (in press) also provided some training 
to participants in a judgment of contingency task. Their 
experiment was designed to examine Sherif ’s theory of 
contrast and assimilation (Sherif, Taub, & Hoviand, 1958) in 
the judgment of contingency. Because Clark and Benassi’s 
interest was in judgmental displacement away from anchoring
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judgments, they wanted to establish that participants1 
initial judgments were relatively accurate.
Clark and Benassi (in press) gave participants four 
contingency time lines modeled after those of Wasserman and 
Shaklee (1984) and Newman and Benassi (1989) . The first two 
time lines provided an anchor for participants' judgments of 
the third and fourth time lines. The initial time lines hadAP
= .00, .50, or 1.00, depending on experimental condition. The 
page containing the first time line also had a sentence 
indicating to participants the actual value of that time line 
on the judgment scale (0, 5, or 10, respectively, on a 21 
point scale: -10 = prevents buzzing. 0 = has no effect. 10 = 
causes buzzing) . The second time line in each condition was 
identical to the first, but the second page did not contain 
any information telling the participants the value of that 
time line on the judgment scale.
How much effect did exposure to an accurate assessment 
of contingency have on participants? The best way to answer 
this question is to compare the judgments of participants in 
Clark and Benassi's (in press) experiment to the judgments of 
participants in a similar experiment. Newman and Benassi 
(1989, Experiment 3) also had three experimental conditions 
with initial time lines of AP = .00, .50, or 1.00. Their
participants, however, were not given any training in how to 
judge the time lines. Newman and Benassi (1989) obtained mean 
contingency judgments of 1.58, 4.40, and 8.85, respectively,
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for the three initial time lines. Clark and Benassi (in 
press) obtained mean contingency judgments of .89, 4.89, and 
9.32, respectively. The mean judgments in Clark and Benassi's 
experiment were closer to the nominal value of each 
contingency (.00, .50, and 1.00) . This finding appears to be
due to the training and to the fact that the first two time
lines were identical. This comparison indicates that 
participants in Clark and Benassi's experiment learned from 
the first time line. Unfortunately, this experiment does not 
provide any data concerning long-term improvements in 
judgmental accuracy or how practice might affect judgments.
In the experiments of Jenkins and Ward (1965) and Clark
and Benassi (in press), the amount of training and the total
exposure to judging contingencies was minimal. Participants 
in Jenkins and Ward's Experiment 3 completed a total of seven 
contingency problems (only two were training problems). 
Participants in Clark and Benassi's experiment judged four 
contingency problems (only one was a training problem) . The 
present experiments were designed to overcome these 
limitations by providing ongoing training (i.e., accurate 
feedback) to participants for a large number of contingency 
problems.
The Discriminability of.. Covariation
There is evidence from a number of experiments that the 
relation between objective and judged covariation may not be 
linear. For example, Well, Boyce, Morris, Shinjo, and
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Chumbley (1988) presented participants with three sets of 60 
paired numbers. The numbers in each set had a different 
objective correlation: .10, .60, or .90. After each set was 
presented to participants, they recorded their judgment on a 
scale that ranged from 0 (no relationship) to 100 (perfect 
relationship) . The mean judgments of participants who 
observed the number sets were as follows: x =.10, M = 30.35; 
X =.60, M = 32.95; x =.90, M = 57.05. The difference between 
mean judgments of the .10 and .60 correlations was 2.6 units,
while the difference between mean judgments of the .60 and
.90 correlations was 24.10 units. Even though there was less 
absolute difference between the .60 and .90 correlations, 
participants showed more discrimination between them than 
between the .10 and .60 correlations.
Bobko and Karren (1979) presented participants with 
scatterplots representing correlations of .00, .35, and .64. 
Participants estimated the correlation coefficient between 
the x and y variables to two decimal places. The difference 
between the median judgments of the .00 (median = .00) and 
.35 (median = .10) correlation scatterplots was only .10 
units. The difference between the median judgments of the .35
and .64 (median = 50) correlation scatterplots was .40 units.
Again, there is evidence of a difference in discriminability 
along the covariation continuum.
Clark and Benassi (in press) noted this difference in 
discriminability and discussed its implications for
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experiments designed to produce context effects (i.e., 
contrast and assimilation). As an experimenter, one must be 
mindful that any "midrange" stimuli are midrange not only in 
objective terms, but also in psychophysical terms.
The above examples (Well et al., 1988, and Bobko & 
Karren, 1979) and the discussion of Clark and Benassi (in 
press) focus on the discriminability of covariation between 
.00 and 1.00. What evidence is there concerning the 
discriminability of covariation along the continuum from 
-1.00 to 1.00? wasserman & Shaklee (1984) reported data that 
are informative on this topic. In their four experiments, 
they presented contingencies ranging from -1.00 to 1.00 and 
found a difference in discriminability between negative and 
positive contingencies. In their Experiment 3, for example, 
participants examined time lines which presented Kim's 
tapping on the radio's wire and the radio's buzzing. 
Participants then recorded their judgments on a scale that 
ranged from -4 (prevents sound from occurring) to 4 (causes 
sound to occur).
Participants in the broken time line condition (a paper- 
and-pencil equivalent of a discrete trial procedure), showed 
a difference in discriminability between negative 
contingencies and positive contingencies. On problems with an 
outcome probability of .50, the following mean judgments were 
obtained: AP = -1.00, M = -2.12; AP = -.50, M = .16; AP =
.00, M = .36; AP = .50, M = 1.60; AP = 1.00, M = 3.80. The
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difference between judgments of the -1.00 and -.50 time lines 
was 2.28 units. The difference between the -.50 and .00 time 
lines was .20 units. The difference between the .00 and .50 
time lines was 1.24 units. And the difference between the .50 
and 1.00 time lines was 2.20 units.
This pattern of mean judgments suggests two conclusions. 
First, there is less discrimination between problems with low 
levels of contingency (-.50 to .00) than there is between 
problems with high levels of contingency (-1.00 to -.50).
This is the same pattern of discriminability that has been 
noted for positive contingencies. Second, there is less 
discrimination between perfect negative contingency and 
noncontingency (2.48 units) than there is between perfect 
positive contingency and noncontingency (3.44 units). This 
pattern of results indicates that negative contingencies may 
be more difficult to discriminate among than positive 
contingencies.
The data of wasserman and Shaklee (1984) suggest that 
people are not as good at discriminating among negative 
contingencies as they are at discriminating among positive 
contingencies. Their results indicate that the psychophysical 
function for the judgment of contingency is a gently curving 
backwards "s" that underestimates the actual contingency of 
the problems. For this reason, the first experiment of this 
dissertation was focused on those contingencies that are more 
discriminable, specifically, contingencies between .00 and
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1.00. The second experiment was conducted to examine whether 
the same pattern of judgmental accuracy would be found for a 
more difficult to discriminate set of contingencies 
(contingencies between -1.00 and .00) .
Response Rate and Judgmental Accuracy
When judgmental accuracy is the goal, the best response 
strategy is to respond on half of the trials. This is the 
case because one would want to have an equally large number 
of trials with a response and without a response on which to 
base one's judgment. Any deviation from responding half of 
the time reduces the amount of information for either p(0/R) 
or p(0/no R) .
wasserman et al. (1983) found in their Experiment l that 
there was a difference in judgmental accuracy as a result of 
the rate of response. Wasserman et al. rank ordered their 
participants in both conditions (press button or tap button) 
according to participants' mean probability of response over 
all the problems. They then performed a median split in each 
condition. The resulting four groups were press-low, tap-low, 
press-high, tap-high, with mean response probabilities of 
.17, .23, .37, and .44, respectively.
The press-high (p = .37) and tap-high (p =.44) groups 
had mean judgments of contingency that were very close to the 
nominal values of the contingencies. The tap-low group (p = 
.23) had mean judgments that were relatively accurate for 
positive contingencies, but participants in this group
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underestimated the degree of relation for negative 
contingencies. The press-low group (p = .17) produced a 
flattened function in which participants underestimated the 
actual relation of both negative and positive contingencies.
In the present experiments, participants will be 
encouraged to respond on about half of the trials to promote 
judgmental accuracy. Research by Benassi and Mahler (1985) 
found that participants do respond about half the time when 
they are instructed to do so. If participants’ rate of 
response, however, is as extreme as that of Wasserman et 
al.'s (1983) tap-low or press-low groups, their judgmental 
accuracy should diminish.
Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986) refers to the extent to 
which people are confident they possess the ability to 
successfully perform certain behaviors. Self-efficacy has 
been shown to influence performance on a number of tasks and 
has been shown to have an effect above and beyond general 
ability (Bandura, 1990) .
For example, Collins (as reported in Bandura, 1990) 
found that belief in one's mathematical ability influenced 
performance on a difficult problem-solving task at all levels 
of ability. She selected children with high, medium, or low 
levels of mathematical ability and then determined their 
level of mathematical self-efficacy. Actual ability was an
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important factor in performance on the problem-solving task, 
but at each level of actual ability there was a difference 
between children who expressed high and low self-efficacy. (I 
have estimated the following percentages from Bandura's 
Figure 14.4.) Children with low mathematical ability who 
expressed high self-efficacy solved 42% of the problems, 
while those who expressed low self-efficacy solved 19%. There 
was a 23 unit difference between the two groups. At the 
medium level of mathematical ability, children who expressed 
high self-efficacy solved 48% of the problems, and the 
children who expressed low self-efficacy solved 29%: a 
difference of 19 units. Among the children with a high level 
of mathematical ability, there was still a difference between 
those who expressed high self-efficacy (67% solved) and low 
self-efficacy (58% solved), but the difference between them 
was only 9 units.
The results of Collins (as reported in Bandura, 1990) 
indicate that at all levels of ability, self-efficacy had an 
effect on the performance of a difficult task. In the present 
research, it is predicted that high self-efficacy should lead 
to more judgmental accuracy.
Bandura and Wood (1989) found that participants who were 
informed that an experimental task was easy and who were 
given low performance standards showed increasing levels of 
self-efficacy during the course of their experiment. 
Conversely, participants who were informed that the task was
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difficult and who were given high performance standards 
showed decreasing levels of self-efficacy over the course of 
their experiment. In the present research, the judgment tasks 
are relatively difficult, but no information will be given to 
participants with respect to how difficult they are. One 
dimension of difficulty, however, might be whether 
participants receive feedback concerning their judgments. If 
participants have no knowledge of how well they are doing, 
this might make the task more difficult. In the present 
research, the self-efficacy scales will be administered 
several times to find whether self-efficacy changes as a 
result of receiving feedback about one's judgmental accuracy.
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EXPERIMENT 1 METHODS
In Experiment 1, my principle focus was to investigate 
the effects of receiving feedback versus not receiving 
feedback on judgments of positive contingencies. Participants 
completed three sets of seven problems in a discrete-trial 
format and one set of 14 problems in a summary table format. 
During the discrete-trial format, half of the participants 
received feedback after each problem while the other half did 
not. No feedback was given during the summary table task.
This experiment was also designed to investigate whether 
increased exposure to a judgment of contingency task would 
improve judgments. It may be that exposure to a judgment of 
contingency task and multiple problems will improve 
judgmental accuracy. In addition, this experiment was 
designed to investigate whether feedback has an effect on 
self-efficacy. Last, the inclusion of the summary table task 
allows for an assessment of whether accuracy on one judgment 
of contingency task transfers to accuracy on a different 
contingency task.
Research Participants
Eighty-six undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology courses participated in this 
experiment to fulfill a requirement. They were randomly 
assigned to experimental conditions with the restriction that 
the feedback and no feedback conditions contain am equal
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number of participants. Each student was recruited for two
hours of participation.
Materials
The materials consisted of self-efficacy scales, 
contingency problems, and an open-ended question about 
judgment strategy.
The self-efficacy scales were adapted from Bandura and 
Wood (1989) . They consisted of four items on which 
participants reported how confident they were that they could 
make more accurate judgments than 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of 
the participants in the experiment. Participant responses 
were based on a nine-point scale (l = no confidence. 5 = some 
confidence, 9 = complete confidence). The self-efficacy 
scales were presented after participants had completed a 
practice problem and at the conclusion of each set of 
contingency problems.
The discrete-trial contingency problems were presented 
by means of a HyperCard program on Macintosh computers. Each 
contingency problem consisted of 24 three-second trials, with 
a half-second blank screen between trials. Participants could 
respond (press the space bar) at any time during the three 
second trial. At the end of each trial, the screen would 
either flash or not flash based on the participant's response 
and the programmed probabilities. At the end of each problem, 
participants provided a judgment of contingency in response 
to the question, "What was the effect of your behavior
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(pressing and not pressing on the space bar) on the screen's 
flashing?" Judgments were based on a 201 point scale (-100 = 
prevents flash from occurring. 0 = has no effect. 100 = 
causes flash to occur). The HyperCard program recorded each 
response, outcome, and judgment.
After each judgment of a discrete trial problem (except 
a practice problem), participants in the feedback condition 
received information concerning their accuracy. A window 
appeared which informed than of the actual contingency of the 
problem and how much their judgment deviated from that value.
The summary table contingency problems were based on 
materials used by Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) . Wasserman and 
Shaklee presented a problem in which a person (Kim) is trying 
to find the cause of her radio's occasional buzzing by 
pressing on one of its internal wires. The table summarizes 
the number of times that each response-outcome possibility 
occurred during a given problem. Participants' judgments of 
these problems were made in response to the question "If you 
were Kim, what would you conclude was the effect of your 
behavior (tapping and not tapping on the wire) on the radio's 
buzzing?", and were based on a 9 point scale (-4 = prevents 
sound from occurring. 0 = has no effect. 4 = causes sound to
£££U£).
The open-ended question solicited people's judgment 
strategy for the previous set of problems: "Please describe 
below how you made your judgments on the last seven problems.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
That is, on what did you base your evaluations?” Participants 
were given a full sheet of paper on which to write their 
response.
Contingency Problems
Each contingency problem consisted of 24 trials. During 
each trial there was an opportunity for a response (R or no 
R) and an outcome (0 or no 0) . There were seven contingency 
problems in the discrete-trial task. The problems had 
programmedAp values evenly spaced between .00 to 1.00. The
problems were also programmed so that there would be an 
outcome frequency of .50 given a response frequency of .50. 
The programmed problems are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Programmed Contingency Problems For The Discrete-Trial Task In Experiment 1








The actual AP of the problems could differ from the 
programmed AP values because of the number of trials per 
problem and the probabilistic nature of the computer program. 
Whether a flash occurs is based on the programmed 
probabilities for that problem. If the programmed probability
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for an outcome given a response is .67 [p(0/R) = .67] , it means 
that on any given trial when there is a response, there is a 
.67 chance that the screen will flash. This means that there 
is a .33 chance that the screen will not flash even though 
there was a response, with a large number of trials, the 
actual frequency of an outcome would be very close to the 
programmed probability, but with a small sample of 24 trials, 
there is a difference on some problems. In addition, if a 
participant responds a great deal or very little on a 
particular problem, the actual AP may vary from the 
programmed AP because of the small sample size for p(0/R) or 
P(0/no R).
The seven problems were presented in five different 
random orders to assess whether there would be any order or 
context effects. Analyses of judgmental accuracy as a result 
of problem order revealed no systematic bias.
In the summary table task, the number of times that each 
response-outcome possibility occurred during a given problem 
was summarized for participants. The 14 problems used in this 
experiment are the 14 problems from Wasserman and Shaklee 
(1984) that hadAP values from .00 to 1.00. The problems had
outcome frequencies ranging from .125 to 1.00 and had a 
response frequency of .50. The 14 problems were presented in 
a single random order to all participants. The problems are 
listed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Contingency Problems Used In The Summary Table Task in Experiment 1
AP p(0/R) p(0/no R) m
1.00 1.00 .00 .500
.75 .75 .00 .375
.50 .50 .00 .250
.25 .25 .00 .125
.75 1.00 .25 .625
.50 .75 .25 .500
.25 .50 .25 .375
.00 .25 .25 .250
.50 1.00 .50 .750
.25 .75 .50 .625
.00 .50 .50 .500
.25 1.00 .75 .875
.00 .75 .75 .750
.00 1.00 1.00 1.000
Note. Table is based on Wasserman and Shaklee's (1984) Table 1.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a feedback or a 
no feedback condition. They were given the following 
instructions for the discrete-trial task at the beginning of 
the experiment (adapted from Wasserman et al., [1983] and 
Wasserman & Shaklee [1984]) .
The aim of this experiment is to see how people 
judge the relationship between their actions and 
the consequences of those actions. In the seven 
problems that follow, the same basic question is 
posed: What is the relation between your pressing 
the space bar and the occurrence of a brief 
flashing on the computer screen? The seven problems 
differ only in the particular relationship between 
your pressing and the occurrence of the flash. For 
each of the seven problems, please rate the degree 
to which your pressing affects the rate of the 
screen's flashing, from "prevents the flash from 
occurring" to "causes the flash to occur."
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Each of the seven problems will take about 2 
minutes. Each problem consists of 24 three-second 
trials. During each three-second trial you can 
either press the space bar or you can refrain from 
pressing it. At the end of each trial the screen 
may flash or it may not. Depending on your response 
and the screen's outcome, there are four response- 
outcome possibilities: Press-Flash, Press-No Flash, 
No Press-Flash, and No Press-No Flash. Each trial 
is separated by a half-second of blank computer 
screen.
To make an accurate judgment you will need to 
notice what happens when you press the space bar 
and what happens when you don't press it. It will 
be to your advantage to press the space bar on 
about half of the 24 trials.
After participants read these instructions, they 
completed a practice problem, made their judgment of the 
problem, and were given an opportunity to ask the 
experimenter questions about the task. After their questions 
had been addressed, participants completed the pre-task self- 
efficacy scale, judged the seven contingency problems, 
completed the post-task self-efficacy scale, and answered the 
open-ended question about judgment strategy. After a short 
break, participants judged the second set of seven problems, 
completed another post-task self-efficacy scale, and answered 
the open-ended question about judgment strategy. Participants 
went through these steps again in conjunction with the third 
set of problems. After participants finished their third 
short break, they were given the following instructions for 
the summary table judgment task (adapted from wasserman & 
Shaklee, 1984).
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The aim of this experiment is to see how people 
judge the relationship between their actions and 
the consequences of those actions. In the 14 
problems that follow, the same basic question is 
posed: What is the relation between Kim's tapping 
on the wire of a malfunctioning radio and the 
occurrence of a brief buzzing sound that the radio 
occasionally emits. The 14 problems differ only in 
the particular relationship between Kim's tapping 
and the occurrence of the sound. For each of the 14 
problems, please rate the degree to which Kim's 
tapping affects the rate of the radio's buzzing, 
from "prevents the sound from occurring" to "causes 
the sound to occur." It is more important to work 
through the problems carefully and methodically 
than to give quick and offhand reactions.
The next page presented the 14 problems in summary table 
format. The response-outcome possibilities were listed along 
with the number of times that each occurred for a given 
problem. At the top of the page the following instructions 
appeared.
After buying a new radio, Kim finds that it emits a 
brief buzzing sound every so often. Kim finds this 
buzzing sound annoying and decides to find its 
cause. Removing the back of the radio, Kim suspects 
that a wire may be loose. Kim chooses a wire and 
taps on it a number of times in order to see if 
this has any effect on the buzzing sound. In the 
table below, Kim's tapping on the wire and the 
radio's buzzing have been summarized into four 
response-outcome possibilities. The number of times 
that each response-outcome possibility occurred for 
each problem is listed below.
At this point participants judged the 14 problems, 
completed the post-task self-efficacy scale, and completed 
the open-ended question about judgment strategy. Participants 
were then debriefed about the aims of this experiment.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENT 1
Data .Screening
The data of any participant who did not complete the 
experiment in an appropriate manner were excluded from the 
analyses. This rule excluded the data of participants who did 
not complete all of the materials, who conpleted the 
materials out of sequence, or who did not respond 
appropriately on the discrete-trial contingency problems 
(either responding on every trial or not responding at all) .
I collected data for Experiment l until there was 
complete data from 86 people. The judgmental accuracy of each 
participant was assessed as follows. The absolute difference 
between a participant's judgment of a problem and the 
problem's actual contingency was calculated for every 
problem. These absolute difference scores were then averaged 
for each of the problem sets. This produced four mean 
difference scores for each participant (mean difference score 
on problem set l, problem set 2, etc.) .
Data screening revealed same rather extreme difference 
scores. One participant in the feedback condition performed 
poorly on the first two problem sets, with mean difference 
scores of 56.86 and 55.43, respectively. On the third problem 
set, her performance deteriorated, with a mean difference 
score of 103.57. Because this individual was in the feedback 
condition, she probably knew that she was performing worse in
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the third problem set than in the previous problem sets. I am 
at a loss to explain this, and can only comment that it is no 
small feat to be off by an average of 103.57 points on a 201 
point scale.
Because of this individual's extreme scores, X 
implemented an across-the-board selection criteria. I 
excluded the data of any participant whose set l, set 2, or 
set 3 mean difference score was more than three standard 
deviations from the grand mean. (Because the mean difference 
scores for the Kim problem were based on a different scale, 
they were not used in this aspect of the data screening.) Six 
participants were excluded from further analyses. The 80 
remaining participants are evenly divided between the 
feedback and no feedback conditions (40 each), with 16 men 
and 24 women in each condition.
Analysis nf the Discrete-Trial Task 
Mean Difference Scores on Problem Sets 1. 2. and 3
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed using SPSS (1990) . The between-subj ect variables 
were condition (feedback and no feedback) and participant' s 
sex (male and female) . The repeated-measures variable was 
mean absolute difference scores for the three discrete-trial 
problem sets. The means and standard deviations are presented 
in Table 3. The significance level for all statistical tests 
is p < .05. Any test with p > .10 will not be interpreted.
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Table 3
Mean Absolute Difference Scores for the Discrete-Trial Task by Sex (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 40) No Feedback (n = 40)


































1 There were 16 men per condition.
2 There were 24 women per condition.
The ANOVA re v e a le d  t h a t th e r e was no r e l i a b l e m ain
effect or interaction involving the sex independent variable. 
The sex by condition interaction was the only statistical 
test to produce a p value < .10, E (l# 76) = 2.85, p < .10. 
All further analyses collapsed across the sex variable.
A second repeated-measures ANOVA was performed that 
examined experimental condition (between-subject variable) 
and mean absolute difference scores (repeated-measures 
variable) . The means and standard deviations are presented in 
Table 4. Participants in the feedback condition were more 
accurate in their judgments than participants in the no 
feedback condition, E (1, 78) = 7.87, p < .01. There was an 
improvement in judgmental accuracy over the three problem
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
sets, E (2, 156) = 4.37, b < .05. The mean difference scores 
of the no feedback condition remained around 20 for all three 
problem sets, but the mean difference scores of the feedback 
condition improve. This difference in improvement between 
participants in the two conditions is confirmed as a 
significant interaction between condition and problem set, E 
(2, 156) = 4.00, a < .05.
Table 4
Mean Absolute Difference Scores for the Discrete-Trial Task (Experiment 1)
Problem Set
Condition
Feedback (n = 40) No Feedback (n = 40)
M SD M SD
1 19.78 9.27 21.65 9.00
2 16.88 8.87 19.63 8.32
3 13.56 7.40 21.40 10.10
One of the principal questions behind this experiment 
was whether feedback would improve judgmental accuracy. 
Research by Jenkins and Ward (1965) suggested that feedback 
might not improve judgmental accuracy, while research by 
Clark and Benassi (in press) suggested that it might. The 
results indicate that the feedback provided in Experiment l 
inproved judgmental accuracy as evidenced by the decrease in 
mean difference scores.
A second question of this experiment was whether 
practice at judging a number of contingency problems would
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improve judgmental accuracy. Participants became better 
judges of contingency over the three problem sets. This 
effect was due to the considerable improvement shown by 
participants in the feedback condition. The mean difference 
scores of participants in the no feedback condition showed no 
systematic improvement. This pattern of results suggests that 
practice can improve judgmental accuracy when combined with 
feedback, but that practice alone does not improve judgmental 
accuracy.
Mean Judgments of Contingency by Level of Contingency
As discussed in the Introduction, the psychophysical 
function for the judgment of contingency suggests that there 
is a difference in discriminability between different levels 
of contingency. Past research has shown that participants 
tend to underestimate the objective degree of contingency, 
producing a shallow function. This underestimation of the 
degree of contingency is the most pronounced for 
contingencies between -. 50 and . 50.
To assess whether this pattern of judgment held for the 
present study, I examined mean judgments of contingency by 
the level of contingency in the following manner. I 
categorized the problems into seven groups according to 
actual AP. The midpoint of each group's interval was the
value of one of the programmed contingencies (.00, .17, .33, 
.50, .67, .83, 1.00). The lowest group's interval included 
contingencies from - .08 to .08. This interval includes some
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negative contingencies, but none that are far removed from 
noncontingency. Problems with an actual contingency below 
-.08 were not the focus of Experiment l and did not occur 
with great frequency. There were only 115 problems below this 
level out of 1680 problems in Experiment 1 (6.85%) . These 
problems are not included in the present analyses.
The highest group's interval included contingencies from 
.92 to 1.00. This interval is only half that of the other 
intervals, but this group still had a large number of 
problems. There were 339 problems in this group out of 1680 
problems in Experiment l (20.18%). (The midpoint of this 
group is .96, but I refer to it as 1.00 group because [a] it 
is the programmed contingency and [b] most of the problems in 
this group were 1.00 contingencies.)
I calculated the mean actual contingency and the mean 
judgment of contingency for each of the groups. These data 
are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7, for the three problem 
sets. These data are also presented graphically in Figures 2, 
3, and 4. No statistical tests have been performed because of 
nonindependence of the data points. Each participant 
contributed up to seven judgments per problem set. These data 
are presented only for descriptive purposes. (Note that the 
number of data points per group and per condition vary. This 
is because the groups were defined by actual AP and any 
problems with AP lower than - .08 were excluded.)
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Table 5
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 1 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 260) No Feedback (n = 258)
n Mean AP Mean Judgment n Mean AP Mean Judgment
36 .02 17.94 28 .00 9.82
32 .18 31.13 34 .18 6.56
30 .34 29.90 34 .33 21.32
40 .50 51.63 39 .50 39.15
30 .64 49.67 37 .69 76.16
37 .82 81.51 26 .82 76.73
55 .98 90.89 60 .98 96.48
Figure 2
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Table 6
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 2 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 258) No Feedback (n = 264)
n Mean AP Mean Judgment n Mean AP Mean Judgment
22 -.01 6.68 29 .01 6.69
33 .19 22.91 39 .18 9.26
35 .34 40.97 26 .34 19.12
44 .52 44.02 44 .50 43.96
36 .67 63.11 44 .67 58.96
25 .84 73.56 27 .83 77.48
63 .98 94.67 55 .99 95.76
Figure 3
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Table 7
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 3 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 258) No Feedback (n = 267)
n Mean AP Mean Judgment n Mean AP Mean Judgment
22 .01 3.27 32 .01 7.94
36 .19 19.31 37 .19 16.24
31 .33 31.87 27 .33 22.89
52 .50 49.77 49 .50 38.51
32 .68 69.47 36 .67 52.89
31 .82 80.68 34 .82 78.82
54 .99 97.11 52 .99 90.35
Figure 4








0.00 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.83 1.00
—  Feedback 
•■o—  No Feedback
Actual Contingency
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The mean judgment of contingency data show that 
participants' judgments of contingency more closely 
approximate the actual contingencies over the course of the 
three problem sets. This is especially true for the data of 
participants in the feedback condition.
In addition, these data indicate that participants' mean 
judgments of contingency are more accurate for contingencies 
above .50 than they are for contingencies below .50. This 
finding confirms what was described in the introduction as 
the typical psychophysical function for the judgment of 
contingency.
The difference between the judgments of higher versus 
lower levels of contingency can be illustrated by calculating 
the slope and intercept for the least squares regression line 
for all of the contingencies, the contingencies between .00 
and .50, and the contingencies between .50 and 1.00. The 
results are presented in Table 8. A pattern of veridical 
judgments would have a slope of 100 and an intercept of 0.
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Table 8
Slope and Intercept for the Least Squares Regression Line Between Mean Actual 
Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency (Experiment 1)
Coefficients for Contingencies Between
.00 and 1.00 .00 and .50 .50 and 1.00
Problem Set 1
Feedback
Slope 75.94 61.70 93.95
Intercept 12.59 16.64 -.84
No Feedback
Slope 99.74 62.24 111.30
Intercept -322 3.52 -10.92
Problem Set 2
Feedback
Slope 84.22 75.11 103.69
Intercept 6.96 9.07 -9.06
No Feedback
Slope 96.64 74.76 106.65
Intercept -4.13 .66 -10.85
Problem Set 3
Feedback
Slope 97.37 94.44 96.08
Intercept 1.12 1.54 2.31
No Feedback
Slope 88.42 61.10 111.42
Intercept -24 5.82 -17.71
In interpreting these data, consider first the data of 
participants in the feedback condition. On problem set l, the 
slope and intercept are quite different for the low versus 
high ranges of contingency. The slope for the low range of 
contingencies is shallow (61.70) and the intercept is high 
(16.64). The slope for the high range of contingencies is 
steeper (93.95) than for the low range of contingencies and 
the intercept is near 0 (-.84). The slopes have a difference 
of 32.25 and the intercepts have a difference of 17.48. On
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problem set 3, there is only a small difference between the 
slopes and intercepts for the low and high contingencies. 
There is a difference of 1.64 for the slopes and .77 for the 
intercepts. In addition to the two regression lines being 
similar, note that the slopes are relatively close to 100 and 
that the intercepts are both close to 0.
Next consider the data of the participants in no 
feedback condition. On problem set l, there is a considerable 
difference between the slope and intercept for the low and 
high ranges of contingency. The slope for the low range of 
contingencies is shallow (62.24) and the intercept is low 
(3.52). The slope for the high range of contingencies is 
steeper than 100 (111.30) and the intercept is below 0 
(-10.92). The slopes have a difference of 49.06 and the 
intercepts have a difference of 14.44. On problem set 3, the 
pattern of judgment is basically the same. There is a shallow 
slope for the low range of contingencies (61.10) with a low 
intercept (5.82) . There is a slope greater than 100 for the 
high range of contingencies (111.42) with an intercept well 
below 0 (-17.71). Unlike the feedback condition, there is 
still a large difference between the slopes and intercepts 
for the low and the high ranges of contingency.
It appears that the effect of feedback was to bring 
participants' judgments of contingency closer in line with 
veridical judgment. This effect produced similar slopes and 
intercepts for the low and high ranges of contingency.
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Without feedback, there was no systematic coming together of 
judgments for the low versus high ranges of contingency. This 
is another source of evidence indicating that judgmental 
accuracy does not improve with practice alone.
Difference Score bv Level of Contingency
The first analysis I performed (repeated-measures ANOVA) 
examined judgmental accuracy as indicated by mean absolute 
difference scores. These mean absolute difference scores 
represented the average difference between judged contingency 
and actual contingency for the seven problems of each problem 
set. This measure provided a measure of a participant's 
average accuracy across all levels of contingency.
The second analysis I performed examined mean judgments 
of contingency by level of contingency. The mean judgments of 
contingency provided a measure of judgmental accuracy for 
each level of actual contingency. These mean judgments are 
scores that collapse across participants.
In the present set of analyses, I again rely on mean 
absolute difference scores between judged contingency and 
actual contingency, but these mean difference scores collapse 
across individuals and represent mean absolute difference 
scores for each level of contingency. These mean absolute 
difference scores represent the average difference between 
participants' judgments of contingency and the actual 
contingencies for each level of contingency. These analyses
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allow a second way to address the differential 
discriminability of contingencies.
Using the same contingency groups as in the analysis of 
mean judgments of contingency by actual contingency, I 
calculated the mean absolute difference score for each 
contingency group. These data are presented in Tables 9, 10, 
and 11 for problem sets 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The data 
are presented graphically in Figures 5, 6, and 7. No 
statistical tests have been performed because of 
nonindependence of the data points. Each participant 
contributed up to seven judgments per problem set. These data 
are presented only for descriptive purposes. (Note that the 
number of data points per group and per condition vary* This 
is because the groups were defined by actual AP and any 
problems with AP lower than -.08 were excluded.)
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Table 9





Feedback (n = 260) No Feedback (n = 258)
n M SD n M SD
.00 36 22.61 24.00 28 29.43 26.61
.17 32 23.16 16.68 34 24.82 24.06
.33 30 24.57 17.13 34 30.18 20.09
.50 40 21.08 13.56 39 30.05 23.14
.67 30 29.23 24.30 37 16.87 9.45
.83 37 13.73 15.99 26 16.23 18.46
1.00 55 8.40 21.59 60 3.32 7.40
Figure 5











0.00 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.83 1.00
Contingency
Feedback 
-~o—  No Feedback
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Table 10
Mean Absolute Difference Scores by Level o f Contingency for Problem Set 2 
(Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 258) No Feedback (n = 264)
Contingency
Group 11 M SD n M SD
.00 22 19.41 20.40 29 18.38 21.56
.17 33 15.70 15.83 39 26.67 24.72
.33 35 25.91 15.72 26 29.04 11.40
.50 44 20.11 14.81 44 22.80 21.60
.67 36 20.17 16.35 44 23.75 21.98
.83 25 16.24 21.66 27 15.70 20.13
1.00 63 4.78 13.27 55 4.11 14.55
Figure 6
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Table 11





Feedback (n = 258) No Feedback (n= 267)
n M SD n M SD
.00 22 15.27 16.53 32 21.19 24.54
.17 36 16.78 12.08 37 22.03 19.37
.33 31 15.84 11.54 27 30.44 20.70
.50 52 13.87 11.56 49 28.49 17.77
.67 32 14.72 14.16 36 26.47 24.03
.83 31 12.68 14.85 34 15.65 21.18
1.00 54 2.98 8.50 52 9.04 29.62
Figure 7
Mean Absolute Difference Score by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 3 
(Experiment 1)
— □—  Feedback 
— O—  No Feedback
0.00 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.83 1.00 
Contingency
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These data indicate that the smallest mean difference 
scores occur for contingencies in the .83 and 1.00 groups. 
This finding suggests that those problems with an objective 
contingency greater than .75 support the most judgmental 
accuracy (.75 is the lower cutoff for the .83 group). 
Participants are not as accurate in their judgments of 
problems that are less contingent than AP = .75. This
confirms that there is a difference in the discriminability 
of contingencies across levels of contingency.
One pattern in the data was unexpected. In Figure 7, the 
mean difference scores for participants in the no feedback 
condition are lower for contingencies in the .00 and .17 
groups than they are for the middle three groups of 
contingencies (.33, .50, and .67). There is no similar 
improvement in the judgments of participants in the feedback 
condition. This difference led me to believe that 
participants in the no feedback condition judged "0" as a 
default for any problem that was closer to being 
noncontingent than being perfectly contingent. If this is the 
case, it would explain the relatively small mean difference 
scores for the .00 and .17 contingency groups and the 
relatively large difference scores for the .33, .50, and .67 
contingency groups. Participants in the feedback condition 
would not be expected to show this same pattern of judging 
"0"s because they knew that relatively few of the problems 
were actual *'0,,s.
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To find out whether my speculation was correct, I found 
the number of "0" judgments at each level of contingency. The 
results for problem set 3 are presented in Table 12.
Table 12
Number of ”0” Judgments and Total Judgments for Each Level of Contingency in 





"0"s Total % of Total "0"s Total % of Total
.00 4 22 18 12 32 38
.17 3 36 8 13 37 35
.33 3 31 10 9 27 33
.50 1 52 2 7 49 14
.67 0 32 0 4 36 11
.83 0 31 0 0 34 0
1.00 0 54 0 1 52 2
In the feedback condition, only 18% of the judgments in 
the .00 contingency group were "0"s. This is a marked 
contrast to the no feedback condition in which 38% of the 
judgments for this level of contingency were "0"s. In 
addition, participants in the no feedback condition judged 
that over one-third of the problems in the .17 and .33 groups 
were "0"s. These participants even judged that over 10% of 
the problems in the .50 and .67 contingency groups were "0,,s.
The use of "0" as a default judgment would help account 
for the no feedback condition's having smaller mean absolute 
difference scores for the contingencies in the .00 and .17
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groups and having relatively larger mean absolute difference 
scores for contingencies in the .33, .50, and .67 groups. 
Response Rate
Wasserman et al. (1983) found a difference in judgmental 
accuracy as a function of participants' response rate. In 
their Experiment l, a median split of participants according 
to their mean response rate produced four groups: press-low, 
tap-low, press-high, and tap-high. The four groups had mean 
response probabilities of .17, .23, .37, and .44, 
respectively. (Mean response probability refers to the 
probability of a response on a given trial.) The press-high 
and tap-high groups provided judgments of contingency that 
were consistent with the actual contingencies for the 
problems. The press-low and tap-low groups were less accurate 
in their judgments of contingency.
To assess whether this pattern of judgment is supported 
by the present research, I performed a three-way split of 
participants according to their mean response rate. The top 
third of participants had a mean response rate above 13.74 
(mean response probability = .63) . The bottom third of 
participants had a mean response rate below 12.66 (mean 
response probability = . 49.). I then compared the mean 
absolute difference score on the three problem sets for the 
high and low response thirds. These means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 13.
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Table 13
Mean Absolute Difference Scores on the Discrete-Trial Task for Participants with a High 
or Low Response Rate (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 29) 1 No Feedback (n = 23) 2
Problem Set M 2D M 2D
1






























1 In the feedback condition, there were 14 participants with a high response rate and 15 
participants with a low response rate.
2 In the no feedback condition, there were 12 participants with a high response rate and 
11 participants with a low response rate.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed that examined 
condition (feedback and no feedback) and response rate (high 
and low) as between-subject variables. The repeated-measures 
variable was mean absolute difference scores on the three 
problem sets. There was no systematic difference in 
judgmental accuracy associated with response rate, £ (1, 48) 
=2.26, e < .10). None of the interactions involving response 
rate were significant (all p values > .10).
The present research did not produce the same pattern of 
results that Wasserman et al. (1983) found. I suspect that 
the reason for this difference stems from the different 
response patterns in our experiments. In Wasserman et al.' s
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Experiment 1, the press-low and the tap-low groups had very- 
low mean response probabilities (.17 and .23, respectively). 
The press-high and tap-high groups had mean response 
probabilities that were within 15 units of an optimal rate of 
response (.37 and .44, respectively). In try Experiment 1, 
both the low and the high response rate groups had a mean 
response probability that was within 15 units of an optimal 
rate of response (.49 and .63, respectively).
In sum, the difference between what Wasserman et al. 
(1983) found for response rate and what I found may be due to 
the fact that most of the participants in my Experiment 1 
responded at a near optimal rate. In the Wasserman et al.'s 
Experiment l this was not the case.
Self-Efficacy
One of the questions of this research was whether 
receiving feedback about one's performance would influence 
self-efficacy. A mean self-efficacy score was obtained for 
each participant on each of the self-efficacy scales. Because 
this analysis examines whether feedback influences self- 
efficacy, the data from the first and fifth self-efficacy 
scales are not included. There was no feedback for either the 
practice problem (which preceded the first self-efficacy 
scale) or the summary table task (which preceded the fifth 
self-efficacy scale).
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The mean self-efficacy scores for the second, third, and 
fourth self-efficacy scales are presented in Table 14. Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of self-efficacy.
Table 14
Mean Self-Efficacy Scores for Self-Efficacy Scales 2,3, and 4 by Sex (Experiment 1)
Self-Efficacy Scale
Condition
Feedback (n = 40) No Feedback (n = 40)
M SD M SD
2
Male 1 5.72 1.43 5.61 1.14
Female 2 5.30 1.37 5.24 1.28
3
Male 6.36 1.73 5.64 1.60
Female 5.43 1.70 5.33 1.78
4
Male 6.52 1.57 5.27 1.60
Female 5.52 1.48 5.00 1.59
1 There were 16 men per condition.
2 There were 24 women per condition.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with condition 
(feedback and no feedback) and sex (male and female) as the 
between-subject variables. Mean self-efficacy score was the 
repeated-measures variable. Male participants reported higher 
levels of self-efficacy than female participants, but this 
test failed to reach the p < .05 level, E (l, 76) = 3.41, p < 
. 07. None of the interactions involving the sex variable had 
p values < .10.
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A second repeated-measures ANOVA was performed which 
collapsed across participant's sex. The mean self-efficacy 
scores and standard deviations are presented in Table 15.
Table 15
Mean Self-Efficacy Scores for Self-Efficacy Scales 2 ,3 , and 4 (Experiment 1)
Self-Efficacy Scale
Condition
Feedback (n= 40) No Feedback (n = 40)
M SD M SD
2 5.47 1.39 5.39 1.23
3 5.80 1.75 5.46 1.35
4 5.92 1.58 5.11 1.58
There was no difference in self-efficacy as a result of 
receiving feedback, E (l, 78) = 1.97, p > .10. There was no 
main effect for the repeated-measures variable, £ (2, 156) = 
l.ll, B > .10. There was, however, a significant interaction 
between condition and the repeated-measures variable, E (2, 
156) = 3.79, p < .05. For the feedback condition, mean self- 
efficacy increased over the course of the experiment. For the 
no feedback condition, mean self-efficacy decreased.
These analyses reveal two interesting patterns. First, 
there was a tendency for male participants to report higher 
levels of self-efficacy than female participants. This is 
interesting in light of the fact that there was no difference 
in judgmental accuracy as a function of participants' sex. 
Second, there was no main effect for condition (feedback or
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no feedback) on self-efficacy. The interaction between 
condition and the repeated-measures variable revealed that 
participants in the feedback reported more self-efficacy as 
the experiment progressed.
The above analyses address whether receiving feedback 
influences self-efficacy. I conducted another analysis to 
assess whether participants with high self-efficacy were 
better judges of contingency than participants with low self- 
efficacy. I calculated mean self-efficacy scores for each 
participant over the second, third, and fourth self-efficacy 
scales. Participants were selected for this analysis by their 
having a mean self-efficacy score on these scales that was in 
the top third or bottom third of all participants. The top 
third of participants had a mean self-efficacy score above 
6.20. (The mean self-efficacy score for these 27 participants 
was 6.97. [SD = .54] .) The bottom third of participants had a 
mean self-efficacy score below 4.95. (The mean self-efficacy 
score for these 27 participants was 4.10 [SD = .77] .) I 
calculated the mean absolute difference scores on the 
discrete-trial task for these participants (see Table 16) .
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Table 16
Mean Absolute Difference Scores on the Discrete-Trial Task for Participants with High 
or Low Self-Efficacy (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 30) 1 No Feedback (n = 24)2



































1 In the feedback condition, there were 18 participants with high self-efficacy and 12 
participants with low self-efficacy.
2 In the no feedback condition, there were 9 participants with high self-efficacy and IS 
participants with low self-efficacy.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with condition 
(feedback and no feedback) and self-efficacy (high and low) 
as the between-subject variables. Mean absolute difference 
scores on the three problem sets of the discrete-trial task 
was the repeated-measures variable. There was no difference 
in judgmental accuracy for participants in the high versus 
low self-efficacy groups, E (l, 50) = .07, p > .10. The 
interaction between condition and self-efficacy approached 
the p < .05 level of significance, E (l, 50) =3.68, p < -07. 
Participants with high self-efficacy in the feedback 
condition showed more judgmental accuracy than participants 
with low self-efficacy. In the no feedback condition it was
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just the opposite, participants with high self-efficacy 
showed less judgmental accuracy than participants with low 
self-efficacy. None of the other interactions was significant 
(all p values > .10) . There was no main effect for the 
repeated-measures variable of judgmental accuracy over the 
three problem sets (p > .10) .
Bandura (1986) and Collins (as reported in Bandura,
1990) report that self-efficacy has been shown to influence 
performance above and beyond the influence of general 
ability. Collins found that children with high self-efficacy 
solved more math problems than children with low self- 
efficacy. In the present research, participants with high 
self-efficacy were better judges of contingency, but only in 
the feedback condition. In the no feedback condition, 
participants with high self-efficacy were worse judges of 
contingency than participants with low self-efficacy. Why 
were these participants poor judges of contingency? One 
reason might be that these participants were confident in 
their ability and their judgments to the extent that they 
were not attentive to the differences between the problems 
they performed.
Analysis of the. Summary Table Task 
Mean Difference Scores on the Summary Table Task
An initial assessment of judgmental accuracy on the 
summary table task revealed that there was no difference 
between the two experimental conditions. Both conditions had
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the same mean absolute difference score (M = 1.03) and 
similar standard deviations (feedback SD = .60, no feedback 
SD = -51; n = 40 for both conditions) . (This is a small mean 
difference score, but it comes from judgments made on a nine 
point scale. As a ratio of mean difference score to the size 
of the judgment scale, this is equivalent to a mean 
difference score of 23 on the 201 point scale used in the 
discrete-trial task.) it appears that feedback did not have a 
systematic effect on judgmental accuracy on a new task. 
Correlation Between Mean Absolute Difference Scores on
Problem Set 2. of the Discrete-Trial Task and the Summary
Table Task
There was no between-condition difference in judgmental 
accuracy, but it may be the case that participants who were 
accurate on the discrete-trial task were also accurate on the 
summary table task. To assess whether there was any 
consistency between performance on the two tasks at the level 
of the individual, mean absolute difference scores on problem 
set 3 (the last of the discrete-trial problem sets) and 
problem set 4 (the summary table task) were correlated. The 
correlation approached the .05 level, r = .21, p < .07, n = 
80. This suggests that participants who were relatively 
accurate on one of the tasks were also relatively accurate on 
the other task.
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Taken separately, neither the feedback (r = -21, p >
.10, n = 40) nor the no feedback conditions (x = .25, p >
.10, a = 40) approached significance due to the sample size.
Comparison to Wasserman and Shaklee (1984)
The above analyses show little evidence of a transfer of
judgmental accuracy from one contingency task to another. If 
there were a transfer, the mean absolute difference scores on 
the summary task would be expected to be smaller for 
participants in the feedback condition. The discrete-trial 
task may still have had an effect on participants' judgments 
on the summary task. Whether this is the case can be found by 
comparing participant' s judgments of these problems to the 
judgments obtained by wasserman and Shaklee (1984) . Table 17 
presents mean judgments and standard deviations of the 
summary table problems from the present research (collapsed 
across the feedback and no feedback conditions).
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Table 17
Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Judgments to the Summary Table 
Contingency Problems (Experiment 1)
Contingency






































Average .01 .46 1.49 1.92 3.33
Note, a =80
1 Denotes the probability of an outcome.
Table 18 presents Wasserman and Shaklee's (1984) data from 
their Experiment 4 for the same contingency problems.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
Table 18
Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Judgments to the Summary Table 
Contingency Problems from Wasserman and Shaklee (1984, Experiment 4)
Contingency






































Average .13 .77 1.44 2.36 3.10
Note, n = 40
1 Denotes the probability o f an outcome.
These tables reveal a similar pattern of judgment.
First, they show that participants in both experiments 
accurately scaled contingencies. In other words, participants 
judged low contingencies to be lower in value them higher 
contingencies. Figure 8 presents the mean contingency 
judgment for each level of contingency (column averages) for 
Tables 17 and 18.
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Figure 8
Mean Judgments of Contingency for Each Level of Contingency in the Summary Table 
Task from the Present Experiment and from Wasserman and Shaklee (1984,
Experiment 4)
Second, participants in both experiments showed a tendency to 
give higher judgments when there was a higher outcome 
frequency. Figure 9 presents the mean contingency judgment 
for each level of outcome frequency (row averages) for Tables 
17 and 18.
— □—  Present Experiment 
o —- Wasserman and Shaklee
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Contingency
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Figure 9
Mean Judgments of Contingency for Each Level of Outcome Frequency in the Summary 
Table Task from the Present Experiment and from Wasserman and Shaklee (1984, 
Experiment 4 )
— □—  Present Experiment 
----o---- Wasserman and Shaklee
0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875 1
P(O)
The similarity between the data of the present 
experiment and those of Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) is quite 
clear. It appears that having been through the discrete-trial 
task did not have much effect on participants1 judgments of 
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EXPERIMENT 2 METHODS
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to assess whether I 
could replicate the effects of feedback and practice found in 
Experiment l when using a more difficult set of contingency 
problems. In Experiment l I employed contingency problems 
with Ap values between .00 and 1.00. In Experiment 2 I 
employed problems withAP values between -1.00 and .00.
I did not collect data on self-efficacy, judgment 
strategies, or the transfer of judgmental accuracy from one 
task to another. By not including these elements from 
Experiment l, this experiment required less time from each 
participant. In addition, the length of each trial was 
reduced from three seconds to two seconds and participants 
were not given breaks between the three problem sets. With 
these modifications to Experiment 2, I could recruit 
participants for one hour of participation. This allowed me 
to collect more judgment of contingency data with my 
allotment from the Psychology 401 Participant Pool.
Research Participants
Eighty-six undergraduates enrolled in introductory 
psychology participated in this experiment to fulfill a 
course requirement. They were randomly assigned to 
experimental conditions with the restriction that the 
feedback and no feedback conditions contain an equal number
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of participants. Each student was recruited for one hour of
participation.
Materials
The materials consisted only of instructions for the 
discrete-trial contingency task. The instructions were 
modified slightly from those of Experiment l to reflect the 
changes in Experiment 2.
The contingency problems were presented by means of a 
HyperCard program on Macintosh computers. Each contingency 
problem consisted of 24 two-second trials, with a half-second 
blank screen between trials. Participants could respond 
(press the space bar) at any time during the two-second 
trial. At the end of each trial, the screen would either 
flash or not flash based on a participant's response and the 
programmed probabilities. At the end of each problem, 
participants provided a judgment of contingency in response 
to the question, "What was the effect of your behavior 
(pressing and not pressing on the space bar) on the screen's 
flashing?" Judgments were based on a 201 point scale (-100 = 
prevents flash from occurring. 0 = has no effect. 100 = 
causes flash to occur) . The HyperCard program recorded each 
response, outcome, and judgment.
After each judgment of a discrete trial problem (except 
a practice problem), participants in the feedback condition 
received information concerning their accuracy. A window
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appeared which informed them of the actual contingency of the 
problem and how much their judgment deviated from that value.
The seven contingency problems in Experiment 2 had 
programmed AP values evenly spaced between -1.00 and .00. The
problems were also programmed so that there would be an 
outcome frequency of .50 given a response frequency of .50. 
The programmed problems are presented in Table 19.
Table 19
Programmed Contingency Problems For The Discrete-Trial Task In Experiment 2
AP p(0/R) p(0/no R)
-1.00 .00 1.00
-.84 .08 .92




The seven problems were presented in five different 
random orders to assess whether there would be any order or 
context effects. Analyses of judgmental accuracy as a result 
of problem order revealed no systematic bias.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENT 2
Data Screening 
As in Experiment l, the data of any participant who did 
not complete the experiment in an appropriate manner were 
excluded from the analyses. I collected data for Experiment 2 
until there was conplete data from 86 people. Judgmental 
accuracy was assessed as follows. The absolute difference 
between a participant's judgment of a problem and the 
problem's actual contingency was calculated for every 
problem. These absolute difference scores were then averaged 
for each of the three problem sets.
I applied the same across-the-board selection criterion 
as in Experiment 1. That is, I excluded the data of any 
participant whose set l, set 2, or set 3 mean absolute 
difference score was more than three standard deviations from 
the grand mean. Data from six participants were excluded from 
further analyses. The 80 remaining participants were evenly 
divided between the feedback and no feedback conditions (40 
each), with 16 men and 24 women in each condition.
Analysis of the Piscrete-Trial Task 
Mean Absolute Difference Scores on Problem Sets l. 2. and 3 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed using SPSS (1990) . The between-subject variables 
were condition (feedback and no feedback) and participant's 
sex (male and female) . The repeated-measures variable was
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mean absolute difference scores on the three problem sets.
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 20. 
As was the case with Experiment l, the significance level for 
all statistical tests is p < .05. Any test with p > .10 will 
not be interpreted.
Table 20
Mean Absolute Difference Scores for the Discrete-Trial Task by Sex (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback (n = 40) No Feedback (n = 40)
Problem Set M SD M SD
1
Male 1 20.46 11.71 20.53 10.80
Female 2 21.79 10.21 25.09 9.06
Male 18.34 9.02 19.38 9.73
Female 15.74 5.93 26.36 10.12
Male 18.76 6.71 20.87 10.33
Female 13.82 5.04 25.87 9.29
1 There were 16 men per condition.
2 There were 24 women per condition.
The ANOVA revealed that participants in the feedback 
condition were more accurate in their judgments than 
participants in the no feedback condition, E (1, 76) = 10.02, 
p < .01. There was no main effect for sex (E (l, 76) = 1.25, 
p > .10), but there was a significant interaction between sex 
and condition, E (l» 76) = 6.09, p < .05. The women in the 
feedback condition were the most accurate group of 
participants; the women in the no feedback condition were the
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least accurate group of participants. The men in both 
conditions performed similarly.
There was no main effect for the repeated-measures 
variable, E (2, 152) = 2.00, p > .10. This indicates that 
there was no across-the-board improvement in judgmental 
accuracy over the three problem sets. The interaction between 
the repeated-measures variable and condition approached 
significance, £ (2, 152) = 2.78, p < .07. Participants in the 
feedback condition showed a tendency to improve in judgmental 
accuracy over the three problem sets. There was no 
significant interaction between the repeated-measures 
variable and sex, E (2, 152) = .79, p > .10.
For purposes of comparison with Experiment l, Table 21 
presents mean absolute difference scores for Experiment 2 
collapsed across participant's sex. This table presents 
information comparable to Table 4.
Table 21
Mean Absolute Difference Scores for the Discrete-Trial Task (Experiment 2)
Problem Set
Condition
Feedback (n = 40) No Feedback (n = 40)
M SD M SD
1 21.26 10.71 23.26 9.92
2 16.78 7.33 23.57 10.43
3 15.79 6.19 23.87 9.90
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The data in Table 21 reveal a pattern similar to that of 
Table 4. In the feedback condition there is an improvement in 
participants' mean absolute difference score over the three 
problem sets. There is no comparable improvement in the 
judgments of participants in the no feedback condition. A 
comparison of these tables also reveals that mean absolute 
difference scores are smaller in Experiment 1 than in 
Experiment 2. This finding suggests that the positive 
contingency problems used in Experiment 1 supported more 
judgmental accuracy than the negative contingency problems 
used in Experiment 2.
One of the principal questions behind Experiment 2 was 
whether I would find the same pattern of results as in 
Experiment 1. Just as in Experiment l, feedback improved 
judgmental accuracy in Experiment 2. Further, practice alone 
did not improve judgmental accuracy for the no feedback 
condition.
Mean Judgments of Contingency bv Level of Contingency
As discussed in the Introduction, the psychophysical 
function for the judgment of contingency indicates that there 
is a difference in discriminability between different levels 
of contingency. Past research has shown that participants 
tend to underestimate the objective degree of contingency, 
producing a shallow function. This underestimation of the 
degree of contingency is the most pronounced for 
contingencies between -.50 and .50. This pattern of judgment
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was found in Experiment l. To assess whether it would also be 
found in Experiment 2, I again examined mean judgments of 
contingency by the level of contingency.
I categorized the problems into seven groups by actual 
contingency. The midpoint of each group was the value of one 
of the programmed contingencies (-1.00, -.83, -.67, -.50, 
-.33, -.17, .00). The .00 group's interval included 
contingencies between -.08 and .08. This interval includes 
same positive contingencies, but none that are far removed 
from noncontingency. Problems with an actual contingency 
above .08 were not the focus of this experiment and did not 
occur with great frequency. There were only 108 problems with 
an actual contingency above .08 out of 1680 problems in 
Experiment 2 (6.43%). These problems are not included in the 
present analyses.
The -1.00 group's interval included contingencies 
between -1.00 and -.92. This interval is only half that of 
the other intervals, but this group still had a large number 
of problems. There were 323 problems in this group out of 
1680 problems in Experiment 2 (19.23%). (The midpoint of this 
interval is -.96, but I refer to it as the -1.00 group 
because [a] it is the programmed contingency and [b] most of 
the problems in this group were -1.00 contingencies.)
I calculated the mean actual contingency and the mean 
judgment of contingency for each of the groups. These data 
are presented in Tables 22, 23, and 24 for the three problem
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sets. These data are also presented graphically in Figures 
10, 11, and 12. For ease of comparison to Figures 2, 3, and 
4, the axes of Figures 10, 11, and 12 have been reversed so 
that an underestimation of contingency falls below the 
diagonal that represents veridical judgment. No statistical 
tests have been performed because of nonindependence of the 
data points. Each participant contributed up to seven 
judgments per problem set. (Note that the number of data 
points per group and per condition vary. This is because the 
groups were defined by actual AP and any problems with AP
greater than .08 were excluded.)
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Table 22
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 1 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback (n = 261) No Feedback (n = 261)
n Mean AP Mean Judgment n Mean AP Mean Judgment
49 -99 -95.18 52 -.99 -99.00
50 -.82 -71.48 31 -.84 -77.13
34 -.68 -61.18 36 -.67 -55.11
37 -51 -38.76 44 -50 -2852
32 -34 -27.75 35 -34 -3.34
32 -.19 -5.34 37 -.19 -8.95
27 .01 4.44 26 -.02 -5.39
Figure 10
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Table 23
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 2 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback (n = 268) No Feedback (n = 260)
n Mean AP Mean Judgment n Mean AP Mean Judgment
56 -.99 -95.04 51 -99 -99.10
34 -.82 -77.29 33 -.82 -66.88
38 -.66 -58.92 38 -.68 -4235
37 -30 -42.08 43 -31 -27.19
31 -35 -30.29 29 -34 -20.86
43 -.19 -1836 40 -.17 -5.23
29 .00 5.07 26 .00 1.08
Figure 11
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Table 24
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 3 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback (n = 2S8) No Feedback (n = 264)
n Mean AP Mean Judgment & Mean AP Mean Judgment
57 -.98 -96.49 58 -.99 -89.83
24 -.84 -8934 27 -.83 -81.48
36 -.68 -6538 42 -.69 -51.19
47 -.49 -46.32 37 -30 -25.16
30 -35 -2630 34 -34 -633
37 -.18 -16.70 39
oi -5.69
27 .00 3.89 27 -.03 -2.44
Figure 12
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These data show that the mean judgments of participants 
in the feedback condition more closely approximate the actual 
contingencies than the judgments of participants in the no 
feedback condition. The judgments of participants in the 
feedback condition of Experiment 1 were also closer to being 
veridical than the judgments of participants in the no 
feedback condition.
In Experiment l, participants had a tendency to 
underestimate the degree of contingency for problems that had 
relatively little contingency (AP < .50.). They had less of a
tendency to underestimate problems that had relatively more 
contingency (AP > .50.) In Experiment 2, it appears that
participants had a similar tendency to underestimate problems 
with relatively little contingency. Whether there is a 
systematic difference in the judgment of lower contingency 
problems and higher contingency problems can be assessed by 
calculating the slope and intercept for the least squares 
regression line for all of the contingencies, the 
contingencies between -.50 and .00, and the contingencies 
between -1.00 and -.50. These results are presented in Table 
25. A pattern of veridical judgments would have a slope of 
100 and an intercept of 0.
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Table 25
Slope and Intercept for the Least Squares Regression Line for Mean Actual Contingency 
and Mean Judgment of Contingency (Experiment 2)
Coefficients for Contingencies Between
-1.00 and .00 -.50 and .00 -1.00 and-.50
Problem Set 1
Feedback
Slope 100.22 86.97 113.91
Intercept 8.11 5.39 18.79
No Feedback
Slope 103.38 39.99 142.31
Intercept 13.07 -92 42.23
Problem Set 2
Feedback
Slope 98.70 93.51 109.65
Intercept 4.24 2.92 13.15
No Feedback
Slope 95.97 59.19 150.23
Intercept 11.12 2.16 54.11
Problem Set 3
Feedback
Slope 105.49 97.16 106.63
Intercept 4.89 3.31 5.28
No Feedback
Slope 102.19 44.39 139.84
Intercept 14.47 1.77 42.93
In interpreting these data, consider first the feedback 
condition. On problem set 1, the slope and intercept are 
quite different for the two ranges of contingency. The slope 
for the low range of contingencies is shallow (86.97) and the 
intercept is low (5.39) . The slope for the high range of 
contingencies is steep (113.91) and the slope is high 
(18.79). The slopes have a difference of 26.94 and the 
intercepts have a difference of 13.40. On problem set 3,
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there is a smaller difference between the slopes and 
intercepts for the low and high contingencies (a difference 
of 9.47 for the slopes and 1.97 for the intercepts). In 
addition to the slopes and intercepts being similar, note 
that the slopes are closer to 100 than they were on problem 
set l and that the intercepts are both close to 0.
In contrast, note that there is no comparable 
improvement in the no feedback condition. On problem set l, 
there is a considerable difference between the slopes and 
intercepts for the low and high ranges of contingencies. The 
slope for the low range of contingencies is shallow (39.99) 
and the intercept is low (-.92). The slope for the high range 
of contingencies is steep (142.31) and the intercept is high 
(42.23). The slopes have a difference of 102.32 and the 
intercepts have a difference of 43.15. On problem set 3, this 
pattern is unchanged. The slope for the low range of 
contingencies is shallow (44.39) and the intercept is low 
(1.77). The slope for the high range of contingencies is 
steep (139.84) and the intercept is high (42.93). The slopes 
have a difference of 95.45 and the intercepts have a 
difference of 41.16.
As was found in Experiment l, it appears that the effect 
of feedback was to bring participants' judgments in line with 
veridical judgment. This effect made the slopes and 
intercepts similar for the low and high ranges of
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contingency, without feedback, there was no coming together 
of judgments for the low and high ranges of contingency.
This mean judgment of contingency data support the 
established function for the judgment of contingency.
Overall, people tend to underestimate the objective value of 
contingencies. This is most pronounced for contingencies 
between -.50 and .50. This data supports that there is a 
difference in the differential discriminability of 
contingencies.
Difference Score bv Level of Contingency
In the present set of analyses, I examine mean absolute 
difference scores that represent the difference between 
judged contingency and actual contingency. These mean 
absolute difference scores collapse across individuals and 
show the mean absolute difference scores for contingencies of 
different levels. These analyses allow for a second way of 
assessing the differential discriminability of contingencies.
Using the same contingency groups as in the mean 
judgment of contingency analyses, I calculated the mean 
absolute difference score for each contingency group. These 
data are presented in Tables 26, 27, 28. The data are also 
presented graphically in Figures 13, 14, and 15. For ease of 
comparison with figures 5, 6, and 7, the horizontal axis 
representing contingency has been reversed. Noncontingent 
problems are represented at the left of the figure and
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perfectly contingent problems are represented at the right of 
the figure.
No statistical tests have been performed because of 
nonindependence of the data. Each participant contributed up 
to seven judgments per problem set. These data are presented 
only for descriptive purposes. (Note that the number of data 
per group and per condition vary. This is because the groups 
are defined by actual AP and any problems with AP greater
than .08 were excluded.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
Table 26





Feedback (n= 261) No Feedback (n= 261)
n M Sfi n M m
-1.00 49 5.12 17.22 52 .92 3.74
-.83 50 22.88 39.56 31 22.65 37.24
-.67 34 24.15 26.16 36 33.69 36.01
-50 37 29.30 26.21 44 37.71 18.08
-33 32 26.81 18.01 35 33.20 18.24
-.17 32 26.09 18.06 37 26.46 18.17
.00 27 22.82 22.41 26 10.96 19.08
Figure 13









n i i r
0.00 -0.17 -0.33 -0.50 -0.67 -0.83 -1.00
Contingency
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Table 27





Feedback (n= 268) No Feedback (n= 260)
a M SD n M SD
-1.00 56 4.84 26.70 51 .90 3.79
-.83 34 14.94 17.94 33 27.70 41.43
-.67 38 17.24 19.67 38 38.95 28.21
-.50 37 22.27 15.31 43 32.61 20.37
-33 31 23.52 17.76 29 34.38 15.28
-.17 43 20.98 12.67 40 24.40 18.74
.00 29 17.14 15.25 26 13.85 18.36
Figure 14
Mean Absolute Difference Score by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 2 
(Experiment 2)
— □—  Feedback 
— -o-—  No Feedback
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Table 28





Feedback(n = 258) No Feedback (n= 264)
n M SD n M SD
-1.00 57 3.21 8.99 58 8.86 29.43
-.83 24 7.71 5.78 27 17.89 17.74
-.67 36 16.47 1433 42 31.10 26.78
-.50 47 20.62 19.09 37 40.32 22.29
-33 30 23.17 12.02 34 36.44 21.99
-.17 37 19.05 14.49 39 24.31 13.52
.00 27 16.89 19.99 27 8.59 12.68
Figure 14
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These data reveal a different pattern from what was 
observed in Experiment 1. In Experiment l, the feedback 
condition had mean difference scores that were relatively 
consistent across levels of contingency, but were the 
smallest for contingencies in the .83 and 1.00 groups 
(contingencies above .75) . The no feedback condition had mean 
difference scores that were larger than those of the feedback 
condition, but they also were relatively consistent across 
levels of contingency. The smallest mean difference scores of 
the no feedback condition were for contingencies in the .83 
and 1.00 groups.
in Experiment 2, the feedback condition has a pattern of 
mean difference scores that is similar to that of the 
feedback condition in Experiment 1. The mean difference 
scores were relatively consistent across levels of 
contingency except for the -.83 and -1.00 groups (problems 
more contingent than -.75). For these groups, the mean 
difference scores were the smallest.
The no feedback condition in Experiment 2 did not have 
consistent mean difference scores across levels of 
contingency. Instead, the no feedback condition had 
relatively small mean difference scores for the -1.00 and .83 
groups (problems more contingent than - .75) and for the .00 
group (contingencies between - .08 and .08). Further, the no 
feedback condition had relatively high mean difference scores
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for the - .67, -.50, -.33 groups (contingencies between -.7 5 
and - .25).
I again suspected that participants in the no feedback 
condition judged "0" as a default for any problem that was 
closer to being noncontingent than being perfectly 
contingent. If this is the case, it would help explain why 
participants' mean difference scores were relatively small 
for the .00 contingency group and relatively large for the 
-. 67, -. 50, and -. 33 contingency groups.
I performed the same analysis for problem set 3 of 
Experiment 2 that I performed for problem set 3 of Experiment
1. I found the number of times that participants gave a 
judgment of "0" for contingency problems at each level of 
contingency. The results for sure presented in Table 29.
Table 29
Number of "0" Judgments and Total Judgments for Each Level of Contingency in 





"0"s Total % of Total "0"s Total % of Total
-1.00 0 57 0 1 58 2
-.83 0 24 0 1 27 4
-.67 0 36 0 8 42 19
-50 2 47 4 15 37 41
-33 0 30 0 19 34 56
-.17 7 37 19 24 39 62
.00 8 27 30 16 27 59
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In the feedback condition, only 30% of the judgments in 
the .00 contingency group were "0"s. This is a marked 
contrast to the no feedback condition in which 59% of the 
judgments for this level of contingency were "0"s. In 
addition, participants in the no feedback condition judged 
that over 40% of the problems in the -.17, -.33, and -.50 
groups were "0"s.
The use of "0" as a default answer accounts for the 
participants in the no feedback condition having small mean 
difference scores for the .00 contingency group and large 
mean difference scores for the -.67, -.50, and -.33 
contingency groups.
Overall, the pattern of mean difference scores in this 
experiment suggest that there is a difference in 
discriminability at different levels of contingency. Further, 
these data suggest that the negative contingencies used in 
the second experiment are more difficult to discriminate 
among than the positive contingencies used in Experiment l. 
Response Rate
Wasserman et al. (1983) found a difference in judgmental 
accuracy as a function of participant's response rate during 
the experiment. This finding was not supported in Experiment 
1 of this dissertation. To assess whether it would be found 
in Experiment 2, I again classified participants according to 
mean response rate over the 21 problems of the experiment.
The top third of all participants had a mean response rate
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above 13.89 (mean response probability = .63). The bottom 
third of all participants had a mean response rate below 
12.85 (mean response probability = .51) . The mean difference 
scores on problem sets l, 2, and 3 are presented in Table 30 
for participants with a high or low response rate.
Table 30
Mean Absolute Difference Scores on the Discrete-Trial Task for Participants with a High 
or Low Response Rate (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback (n = 23) f No Feedback (n = 31) 2
Problem Set M SD M SD
1






























1 There were 11 participants with a high response rate and 12 participants with a low 
response rate in the feedback condition.
2 There were 16 participants with a high response rate and IS participants with a low 
response rate in the no feedback condition.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with condition 
(feedback and no feedback) and response rate (high and low) 
as between-subject variables. The repeated-measures variable 
was mean absolute difference scores on the three problem 
sets. The main effect for response rate was not significant,
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E (1,49) = 1.42, p > .10. None of the interactions involving 
response rate were significant (all p values > .10).
As in Experiment l, I found no difference in judgmental 
accuracy as a function of participant's response rate. I 
again suspect that this is due to the fact that participants 
in my Experiment 2 were responding at a rate that was closer 
to an optimal rate of responding than were Wasserman et al.' s 
(1983) participants. Participants in both the high and low 
response rate groups in Experiment 2 were within 15 units of 
an optimal response rate (.63 and .51, respectively).
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Principal Findings o£ -Experiments.and. 2 
My primary question in conducting this research was 
whether feedback and practice would improve participants' 
judgmental accuracy. The results of Experiment 1 and 2 
suggest that feedback combined with practice inproved 
participants' judgmental accuracy on both positive and 
negative contingency problems. Practice alone, as evidenced 
by the judgments of participants in the no feedback 
conditions, did not lead to greater judgmental accuracy.
Experiments 1 and 2 also document the well known 
psychophysical function for the judgment of contingency. The 
judgments of participants in the no feedback conditions 
demonstrated an underestimation of the degree of contingency. 
As is typical, this underestimation was the greatest for 
contingencies between -.50 and .50. The judgments of 
participants in the feedback conditions showed an 
underestimation of objective contingency on problem set 1, 
but improved in judgmental accuracy by problem set 3.
Judgmental Accuracy and Judgment Strategy 
Participants' in the feedback conditions became more 
accurate judges of contingency over the course of the three 
problem sets. To what should I attribute this improvement?
The obvious answer is feedback and practice. But there is 
also a more fundamental question here. How did these
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participants become better judges of contingency? In other 
words, how do people make contingency judgments?
Considerable research has addressed this question with 
rule-based analysis (Allan, 1993; Allan & Jenkins, 1983; 
Wasserman, 1990; Wasserman et al., 1983; Shaklee, 1983; 
Shaklee & Mims, 1981; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980; Shaklee & 
Wasserman, 1986) . Rule-based analysis is an attempt to 
identify which of several judgment rules best describe 
participants' contingency judgments. The assumption behind 
this type of analysis is that if a particular strategy 
describes a participants' judgments, the participant may have 
been using that strategy.
Five rules have been identified as possible judgment 
strategies (Allan, 1993): conditional probability (AP), sum 
of diagonals (AD), frequency of Cell A versus Cell B (Fa -b ) » 
frequency of Cell A versus Cell C (Fa -c ) / and frequency of 
Cell A (FA) .
The rule that would lead to accurate judgments in every 
case is the AP rule (Allan, 1993). AP is the appropriate
statistical measure for the relation between two binary 
variables (Allan, 1980) . It represents the probability of an 
outcome given a response (p [0/R]) minus the probability of an 
outcome given no response (p [0/no R]) . Some research has 
found that people's judgments of contingency are highly 
correlated with objective contingency (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 
1980; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Wasserman et al., 1983;
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Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984) . This correlation, however, does 
necessarily mean that people are using the AP rule. Under
some conditions, the use of other judgment rules will lead to 
judgments that are consistent with the AP rule.
The AD rule applies only to 1R/10 contingency problems 
because it is based on the idea of comparing the number of 
confirming cases (Cells A and D) with the number of 
disconf inning cases (Cells B and C) : AD = (A+D) - (B+C) . Use of 
the AD rule promotes judgments of contingency that are 
perfectly correlated with AP when the probability of a 
response is equal to the probability of no response (p[R] = 
ptno R], or in terms of a 2 X 2 table, [A+B] = [C+D]) .
For participants to use the AP and AD rules, they must
attend to all of the relevant contingency information (all 
four cells of a 2 X 2 table) . Other judgment rules do not 
require this. The Fa -b  rule is based on comparing the number 
of outcomes which occur after a response (Cell A) to the 
number of responses without an outcome (Cell B). The use of 
this rule provides judgments of contingency that are 
perfectly correlated with AP when the probability of an
outcome is equal to the probability of no outcome (p[0] =
.50, or in terms of a 2 X 2 table, [A+C] = [B+D]).
Use of the Fa -c  rule also requires information from two 
cells of a 2 X 2 table. This rule is based on comparing the 
number of outcomes which occur with a response (Cell A) to 
the number of outcomes which occur without a response (Cell
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C) . The use of this rule provides judgments that are 
perfectly correlated with those of AP when the probability of
a response is equal to the probability of no response (p[R] = 
.50, or in terms of a 2 X 2 table, [A+B] = [C+D]) .
For participants to use the Fa -b and Fa -C rules, they 
need information from two cells of a 2 X 2 table. The use of 
the Fa rule, in contrast, is based on the number of times 
that an outcome occurs with a response (Cell A) . The Fa rule 
is often the reported strategy of participants (Smedslund, 
1963) .
In Experiment l of this dissertation, participants were 
asked about their judgment strategy at the end of each 
problem set. They responded to the prompt: "Please describe 
below how you made your judgments on the last seven problems. 
That is, on what did you base your evaluations?"
Participants' responses were coded by myself and one of 
my former students who helped collect the data. We classified 
each response as one of the five rules stated above or 
"other." we were blind to participants' condition and 
judgmental accuracy as we coded the data.
Our coding revealed that very few participants clearly 
state one of the rules as their method of judgment. The vast 
majority of responses were classified as "other." There were 
so few participants who stated rules that no analyses were 
performed on these data.
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One of the problems we encountered was that participants 
lacked a vocabulary to clearly describe the basis for their 
judgments. Many participants struggled to describe how they 
had made their judgments. Even when participants had 
described one of the five judgment rules, they often fumbled 
for words to state it again after another problem set.
The judgment strategies of some participants suggested 
that they based their judgments on formal rules. Other 
subjects did not state formal rules and may have based their 
judgments on processes they cannot describe. It may be that 
an open-ended question about judgment strategies asks 
participants to tell more than they know about the processes 
of their own judgments (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This could 
be another drawback to the use of open-ended questions.
Shaklee (1983) identified a way to assess participants' 
rule use without the problems associated with open-ended 
questions. Shaklee constructed a set of summary table 
contingency problems in which participants' judgments would 
be diagnostic of their judgment strategy. Participants who 
used the AP rule could provide accurate judgments of all the
problems, but some of the problems were constructed so that 
they could also be accurately judged by use of the Fa , Fa -b , 
or AO rules. Participants' judgment strategies would be
inferred from the problems that they judged correctly. Using 
this type of diagnostic problem set, Shaklee and Wasserman 
(1986) found that only 3% of their participants showed a
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pattern of judgment consistent with the use of the AP rule.
The most common pattern of judgment among their participants 
was consistent with the use of the Fa -b rule (38% of 
participants).
How would feedback and practice influence participants ' 
judgments of a diagnostic problem set such as the one used by 
Shaklee and Wasserman (1986)? This is an empirical question 
and could be answered with a follow-up experiment. I would 
predict that feedback and practice would bring participants' 
judgments in line with the AP rule. An experiment of this
sort would introduce the use of feedback and practice into 
the rule-based judgment literature.
Directions, for .Future-Research
In addition to the above idea for a follow-up 
experiment, the results of this dissertation suggest 
additional directions for future research. Here are two ideas 
for additional experiments.
Jenkins and Ward (1965) found that participants' 
judgments of contingency were unrelated to the actual 
contingency of the problems they performed. One criticism of 
their experimental procedure has been that the 2R/20 task 
they employed does not promote accurate judgment (Allen and 
Jenkins, 1980) . Can participants make accurate judgments of 
contingency on a 2R/20 task? Would feedback and practice have 
the same effect on judgmental accuracy in a 2R/20 task as 
they do in a 1R/10 task? I suspect that participants can make
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accurate judgments on a 2R/20 task and that feedback and 
practice would have the same effect on judgments to this task 
as on judgments to a 1R/10 task.
Another experiment would investigate the relation 
between judgmental accuracy and self-efficacy. In their 
contrast and assimilation experiment, Clark and Benassi (in 
press) found that when a judgment task was relatively 
difficult, participants with high levels of self-efficacy 
showed more judgmental displacement from an anchor than 
participants with low levels of self-efficacy. When the 
judgment task was relatively easy, there was no systematic 
difference between the amount of judgmental displacement of 
participants with high versus low levels of self-efficacy. An 
experiment could be conducted in which one group of 
participants would judge relatively easy to discriminate 
contingency problems while another group would judge 
relatively difficult to discriminate contingency problems 
(problems between - .50 and .50). What would the effects of 
feedback and practice be on the self-efficacy of participants 
in the two groups? How would self-efficacy influence 
judgmental accuracy in this setting? Feedback and practice 
might influence self-efficacy, especially for participants 
who must make difficult judgments. Further, high levels of 
self-efficacy might lead to greater judgmental accuracy, 
especially for participants who must make the more difficult 
judgments.
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Hogarth (1981) identified several ways in which most 
judgment experiments are different from how we make judgments 
in the real world. Two of the major differences are that in 
the real world (a) people receive continual feedback and (b) 
people make many judgments as part of an ongoing process. In 
contrast, most experiments provide no feedback on the few 
problems that participants judge. Hogarth claimed that 
feedback is not only absent from most experiments, but that 
its importance is not recognized on a theoretical level. This 
assertion is true, for example, with respect to Crocker's 
(1981) review article.
In her article, "Judgment of Covariation by Social 
Perceivers," Crocker (1981) presented the extant judgment 
literature as it fit into her conception of the six steps of 
making judgments in the real world. Her steps are:
(l) decide what kinds of data to collect, (2) 
sample cases from the population of cases, (3) 
interpret the cases (i.e., code the data), (4) 
recall the data that have been collected and 
estimate the frequencies of confirming and 
disconfirming cases, (5) integrate the evidence, 
and (6) use the estimate as a basis for making 
predictions or judgments, (p. 273)
Crocker's six steps lead to making "predictions or 
judgments," but in reading her article it seems that these 
predictions and judgments are onetime events with no 
subsequent feedback. One could argue that people begin this
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process over again as soon as it is completed, and one could
even argue that these steps are used to evaluate feedback.
But Crocker's six steps of making judgments are not part of 
an explicit feedback system. To make it so, a seventh step 
would need to be added: (7) begin process over again, 
evaluating feedback that result from judgment.
The contribution of the present research is that it 
brings judgment of contingency research one step closer to 
reflecting real-world judgments. As I indicated in the 
Introduction, sensitivity to covariation is an important 
prerequisite of adaptive behavior. Luckily, in the real world 
we usually have feedback and many chances to get it right.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
REFERENCES
Allan, L. G. (1980). A note on measurement of 
contingency between two binary variables in judgment tasks. 
Bulletin of the Psvchonamic Society.. 15^ 147-149.
Allan, L. G. (1993). Hunan contingency judgments: Rule 
based or associative? Psychological Bulletin. 114. 435-448.
Allan, L. G., & Jenkins, H. M. (1980). The judgment of 
contingency and the nature of the response. Canadian Journal 
of Psychology. 34. 1-11.
Allan, L. G. & Jenkins, H. M. (1983) . The effect of 
representations of binary variables on judgment of influence. 
Learning and Motivation. 14. 381-405.
Alloy L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of 
contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: Sadder 
but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 108. 
441-485.
Alloy, L. B., a Tabachnik, M. (1984). Assessment of 
covariation by humans and animals: The joint influence of 
prior expectations and current situational information. 
Psychological Review. 91. 112-149.
Bandura, A. (1986) . Social foundations of thought and 
action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.
Bandura, A. (1990). Conclusion: Reflections on 
nonability determinants of competence. In R. J. Sternberg &
J. Kolligian, Jr. (Eds.), Competence considered (315-362).
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bandura, A., & Wood, R. (1989). Effect of perceived 
controllability and performance standards on self-regulation 
of complex decision making. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology.^ -.56., 805-814.
Benassi, V. A., & Mahler, H. I. M. (1985). Contingency 
judgments by depressed college students: Sadder but not 
always wiser. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 
49. 1323-1329.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
Bobko, P., & Karren, R. (1979). The perception of 
Pearson product moment correlations from bivariate 
scatterplots. Personnel Psychology. 32. 313-325.
Clark, S. C. & Benassi, V. A. (in press). Judgment of 
contingency: Contrast and assimilation, displacement of 
judgments, and self-efficacy. Social Behavior and 
Personality: An International Journal.
Crocker, J. (1981). Judgment of covariation by social 
perceivers. Psychological Bulletin. 90. 272-292.
Herrastein, R. J. (1966) . Superstition: A corollary of 
the principles of operant conditioning. In W. K. Honig (Ed.) 
operant behavior: Areas of research and application. New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts
Hogarth, R. M. (1981). Beyond discrete biases:
Functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental 
heuristics. Psychological Bulletin. 90. 197-217.
Jenkins, H. M., & Ward, W. C. (1965). Judgment of 
contingency between responses and outcomes. Psychological 
Monographs, 73 d, whole n o. 594).
McFarland, D. J. (1971) . Feedback mechanisms in animal 
behavior. London: Academic Press.
Newman, S. E. & Benassi, V. A. (1989). Putting judgments 
of control into context: Contrast effects. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology. 56. 87 6-889.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more 
than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. 
Psychological Review. 84. 231-259.
Peterson, C. (1980) . Recognition of noncontingency. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 38. 727-734.
Shaklee, H. (1983). Human covariation judgment: Accuracy 
and strategy. Learning and Motivation. 14. 433-448.
Shaklee, H., & Mims, M. (1981) . Development of rule use 
in judgments of covariation between events, child 
Development. 52. 317-325.
Shaklee, H., & Tucker, D. (1980) . A rule analysis of 
judgments of covariation between events. Memory & Cognition.
459-467.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
Shaklee, H., & Wasserman, E. A. (1986). Judging 
interevent contingencies: Being right for the wrong reasons. 
Bulletin of. the Psvchonomic Society. 24. 91-94.
Sherif, M., Taub, D., & Hovland, C. I. (1958). 
Assimilation and contrast effects of anchoring stimuli on 
judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 55. 150-155.
Smedslund, J. (1963) . The concept of correlation in 
adults. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology. 4. 165-173.
Ward, w. c., & Jenkins, H. M. (1965). The display of 
information and the judgment of contingency. Canadian Journal 
of Psychology. 19. 231-241.
Wasserman, E. A. (1990) . Detecting response-outcome 
relations: Toward an understanding of the causal texture of 
the environment. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of 
learning and motivation (Vol. 26, pp. 27-82) San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press.
Wasserman, E. A., Chatlosh, D. L., & Neunaber, D. j. 
(1983) . Perception of causal relations in humans: Factors 
affecting judgments of response-outcome contingencies under 
free-operant procedures. Learning and Motivation. 14. 406- 
432.
Wasserman, E. A., & Shaklee, H. (1984). Judging 
response-outcome relations: The role of response-outcome 
contingency, outcome probability, and method of information 
presentation. Memory & Cognition. 12. 270-286.
Well, A. D., Boyce, S. J., Morris, R. K., Shinjo, M., & 
Chumbley, J. I. (1988) . Prediction and judgment as indicators 
of sensitivity to covariation of continuous variables. Memory 
and Cognition. 16. 271-280.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
